Everyone, please welcome my daughter Diana into the world.

She arrived at 7:26am today!

This guide assumes you already have a running Ubuntu 15.10 system on which you want to configure Xen Orchestra, everything else is documented below.

TL;DR: Run this command as root on Ubuntu 15.10...

sudo curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/scottalanmiller/xenorchestra_installer/master/xo_install.sh | bash

---

During the installation of your OS, you'll want to create a user outside of root, I made my user account xoadmin

How to Install Xen Orchestra Source on Ubuntu 15.10 (self compiled) AKA MANUAL installation

sudo apt-get install --yes nfs-common
curl -sL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_5.x | sudo -E bash -
sudo apt-get install --yes nodejs
curl -o /usr/local/bin/n https://raw.githubusercontent.com/visionmedia/n/master/bin/n
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/n
n stable
node -v
npm -v
sudo apt-get install --yes build-essential redis-server libpng-dev git python-minimal
git clone -b stable https://github.com/vatesfr/xo-server
git clone -b stable https://github.com/vatesfr/xo-web
cd xo-server
sudo npm install && npm run build
cp sample.config.yaml .xo-server.yaml
nano .xo-server.yaml

#Edit and uncomment it to have the right path to XO-Web, because XO-Server embeds an HTTP server (we assume that XO-Server and XO-Web are on the same directory). It's near the end of the file:
#  mounts: '/': '../home/xoadmin/xo-web/dist/
#  save and exit

cd ~
cd ../xo-web
sudo npm i [email protected]
sudo npm install
sudo npm run build
cd ../xo-server
sudo npm start

The scripted installation thanks to @scottalanmiller

Github Repo

Below is the preferred Installation method. It includes the systemctl xo-server.service written by @Danp

sudo bash
<password>
sudo curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/scottalanmiller/xenorchestra_installer/master/xo_install.sh | bash
<password>

In your favorite web-browser go to this VM's IP Address, login with the default user: [email protected] and "admin" for the password. Update your Login Details!!

Add your Xen Server(s) and go to town.

Automatically Start XO at Boot - See this Post by @Danp Also copied below.

Create a file in /etc/systemd/system/xo-server.service and enter the below into it.

# systemd service for XO-Server.

 [Unit]
 Description= XO Server
 After=network-online.target

 [Service]
 WorkingDirectory=/opt/xo-server/
 ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/node ./bin/xo-server
 Restart=always
 SyslogIdentifier=xo-server

 [Install]
 WantedBy=multi-user.target

Save the file, and then run to enable the service at start up.

sudo systemctl enable xo-server.service

To monitor the service you can then run

journalctl -u xo-server -f -n 50

For everyone on the newer releases of the "stable build" at least as of April-8-2016 there appears to be a bug when attempting to mount an NFS share; to resolve this follow the short process below

• Login to your XO web console
• Go to Backup
• Select Remote Stores
• Add your NFS Share, it'll likely fail out(unless it's been fixed since this posting)
• Back on your XO console go to /tmp/xo-server/mounts
• Run "ls" to see what mount is listed on your server
• Next run "mount -t nfs nfs-server-ip-address:/path/to-share remote-#"

Replacing nfs-server-ip-address with the actual IP of the remote server and the remote-# with whatever is listed on your console.

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Hey all!

On November 11th I'll be gaming for 24 hours straight to raise money for Golisano Children's Hospital,please hit my page up here and donate to help raise funds.

Thanks,

DustinB

@nerdydad said in Fake Wall or Wall Closet?:

Any suggestions?

Tell your CFO to stop giving tours of your server room and focus on saving money for more important things.

Messing with @Minion-Queen

I'm wondering why I don't have a tank!

Since Scott is our resident expert on said topic, I figure here would be as good a place as any to post SW articles regarding IT people who are in a position where they are unknowingly building an IPOD.

@BradfromxByte thank you for dealing with all of the back and forth and kick ass servers.

@scottalanmiller said in List Windows Printers from PowerShell Command Line CLI:

If you need to remote into a Windows machine and get a list of printers without interrupting the user, this powershell command is quick and easy...

Get-Printer | Format-Table

Make it easier Get-Printer | FT

Reviewing the output of sslscan, it seems we have some depreciated ciphers that need to get pulled.

Waiting for a meeting to start with a client.

@Oksana Who has been using Hyper-V. . .

XCP-ng, Proxmox, or straight KVM.

Hardening a few linux servers from some Medium threats, all High threats have already been remediated.

Also getting over a cold.

For obvious reasons RHEL is annoying, like needing to sign into their paywall to find this information. If you're ever needing to harden a RHEL based OS, specifically to disable SHA1 and CBC you can use the below and reboot the server.

These vulnerabilities are outlined below and the remedy is listed at the bottom. Mind any typo's I've copied the description out of a PDF and there may be some copy/paste artifacts or typos.

Medium (CVSS: 5.3)
 NVT: Weak Key Exchange (KEX) Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH)
 Product detection result
 cpe:/a:ietf:secure_shell_protocol
 Detected by SSH Protocol Algorithms Supported (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.105565
 →)
 Summary
 The remote SSH server is con gured to allow / support weak key exchange (KEX) algorithm(s).
 Quality of Detection (QoD): 80%
 Vulnerability Detection Result
 The remote SSH server supports the following weak KEX algorithm(s):
 KEX algorithm
 | Reason-----------------------------------------------
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 | Using SHA-1
 Impact
 An attacker can quickly break individual connections.
 Solution:
 Solution type: Mitigation
 Disable the reported weak KEX algorithm(s)- 1024-bit MODP group / prime KEX algorithms:
 Alternatively use elliptic-curve Di e-Hellmann in general, e.g. Curve 25519.
 Vulnerability Insight- 1024-bit MODP group / prime KEX algorithms:
 Millions of HTTPS, SSH, and VPN servers all use the same prime numbers for Diffie-Hellman
 key exchange. Practitioners believed this was safe as long as new key exchange messages were
 generated for every connection. However, the first step in the number field sieve-the most efficient
 algorithm for breaking a Diffie-Hellman connection-is dependent only on this prime.
 A nation-state can break a 1024-bit prime.

 Vulnerability Detection Method

 Checks the supported KEX algorithms of the remote SSH server.
 Currently weak KEX algorithms are defined as the following:- non-elliptic-curve Di e-Hellmann (DH) KEX algorithms with 1024-bit MODP group / prime- ephemerally generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1- using RSA 1024-bit modulus key
 
 Details: Weak Key Exchange (KEX) Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH)
 OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.150713
 Version used: 2024-06-14T05:05:48Z
 Product Detection Result
 Product: cpe:/a:ietf:secure_shell_protocol
 Method: SSH Protocol Algorithms Supported
 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.105565)
 References
 url: https://weakdh.org/sysadmin.html
 url: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9142
 url: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9142#name-summary-guidance-for-implem
 url: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6194
 url: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4253#section-6.5

And CBC

Medium (CVSS: 4.3)
 NVT: Weak Encryption Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH)
 Product detection result
 cpe:/a:ietf:secure_shell_protocol
 Detected by SSH Protocol Algorithms Supported (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.105565
 →)
 Summary
 The remote SSH server is con gured to allow / support weak encryption algorithm(s).
 Quality of Detection (QoD): 80%
 Vulnerability Detection Result
 The remote SSH server supports the following weak client-to-server encryption al
 →gorithm(s):
 aes128-cbc
 aes256-cbc
 The remote SSH server supports the following weak server-to-client encryption al
 →gorithm(s):
 aes128-cbc
 aes256-cbc
 Solution:
 Solution type: Mitigation
 Disable the reported weak encryption algorithm(s).
 . . . continues on next page ...
2 RESULTS PER HOST
 6
 . . . continued from previous page ...
 Vulnerability Insight- The 'arcfour' cipher is the Arcfour stream cipher with 128-bit keys. The Arcfour cipher is
 believed to be compatible with the RC4 cipher [SCHNEIER]. Arcfour (and RC4) has problems
 with weak keys, and should not be used anymore.- The 'none' algorithm specifies that no encryption is to be done. Note that this method provides
 no confidentiality protection, and it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use it.- A vulnerability exists in SSH messages that employ CBC mode that may allow an attacker to
 recover plaintext from a block of ciphertext.
 Vulnerability Detection Method
 Checks the supported encryption algorithms (client-to-server and server-to-client) of the remote
 SSH server.
 Currently weak encryption algorithms are de ned as the following:- Arcfour (RC4) cipher based algorithms- 'none' algorithm- CBC mode cipher based algorithms
 Details: Weak Encryption Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH)
 OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.105611
 Version used: 2024-06-14T05:05:48Z
 Product Detection Result
 Product: cpe:/a:ietf:secure_shell_protocol
 Method: SSH Protocol Algorithms Supported
 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.105565)
 References
 url: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8758
 url: https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/958563
 url: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4253#section-6.3

Simply running sudo update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:NO-SHA1:NO-CBC and rebooting the system in question removes these vulnerabilities.

@travisdh1 said in What Are You Doing Right Now:

Going over a bunch of Scotts (now old) videos and documentation on SANs to do a brief overview with our sales team. They might be oldish now, but still the best refence material around.

Yeah I find myself having to go over these from time to time as well, because finding the energy to explain it myself in such a succinct manner is too difficult.

@Obsolesce said in Decrypting a LUKS encrypted drive at boot:

@DustinB3403 Oh is it the boot/os drive of a VM?

No it wouldn't be the boot partition, but a secondary array (R1).

@EddieJennings said in Decrypting a LUKS encrypted drive at boot:

I know it's not your ideal, but have you tried to use /etc/crypttab and store the key in a file somewhere that's owned by root and has 400 permissions, just to see if that method can do the automatic unlocking of the encrypted device?

If you're making said file that /etc/crypttab will use remember to do echo -n 'whatever' > yourfile, instead of just echo, else you'll bang your head against the wall not understanding why the stored password isn't working. Ask me how I know.

I haven't tried it.

@dbeato said in Decrypting a LUKS encrypted drive at boot:

Did this work for you? https://www.malachisoord.com/2023/11/04/decrypt-additiona-luks-encrypted-volumes-on-boot/

I've never seen it, will review.

@Obsolesce said in Decrypting a LUKS encrypted drive at boot:

@DustinB3403 does it have a TPM2 chip?

This vm doesn't, nor a vtpm

So I have an internal development project I'm working on and I'm trying to sort out specifically how I can decrypt a luks encrypted partition built on a separate mdadm R1 at boot time so that the drive is always available if the system should reboot.

Obviously this isn't an ideal solution since the key would have to be stored in plain-text somewhere outside of the array, but I'm curious if anyone else has had to do something like this and what protections that you may have put into place to protect this information.

Alternatively, the obvious solution would be some intervention to unlock the drive after a reboot, but I was hoping to avoid this manual intervention.

Thanks in advance